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7.1  Introduction 
A modem Pandora’s box has been opened. Coming out are such creatures 
as free trade areas (FTAs), regional trading arrangements, and currency blocs. 
Regional blocs are an age-old phenomenon, but in their vibrant new incarna- 
tion they have spread to the corners of  the world with unusual speed. Some 
believe that the box was opened by the Western Europeans when they consoli- 
dated their European Economic Community by  the  Single Market Initiative 
that took effect in 1992 and by the Maastricht Treaty. Others blame (or credit) 
the United States for the final lift when it signed a free trade agreement with 
Canada in  1988 and thereby abandoned its forty years of opposition in prin- 
ciple to regional initiatives. 
Regardless of who is responsible, the important point is that the box is open. 
Three new members joined the European Community (EC), now the European 
Union  (EU) in  1994, bringing the total to fifteen. After the North American 
Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA) expanded the U.S.-Canada  FTA to include 
Mexico, Chile began negotiations to join as well. Four South American coun- 
tries have formed their own customs union (Mercosur). Other countries in the 
region, rather than sitting idle, have dusted off their existing treaty to form an 
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Andean FTA. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
in the Pacific also have decided to get serious about their FTA. 
Opening the box created a controversy. There is no lack of economists and 
politicians who are excited about the new wave of regionalization and opportu- 
nities it has brought upon the world. Others, however, fear it may corrupt the 
fragile efforts of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to make progress toward global free trade. 
Worries  about regional  blocs  date back  to the  early  1950s, when  Viner 
(1950) called economists’ attention  to the distinction between trade-creation 
and trade-diversion  effects of regional FTAs. Specifically, trade diversion oc- 
curs when  members  of  a grouping reorient their trade away from low-cost 
nonmember  countries toward  higher-cost member countries. Regional blocs 
may reduce world welfare if the trade-diversion  effect dominates the trade- 
creation effect. 
More recently, Krugman (1991a) derived a model in which every regional 
bloc pursues an optimal tariff. He showed via simulation that three regional 
blocs  may  minimize  world  welfare.  In a generalized  version  of  Krugman’s 
model that includes transport costs, Frankel, Stein, and Wei  (chap. 4 in this 
volume) show that even after one takes into account the geographic pattern of 
trading blocs, which can be seen to justify a certain degree of regional prefer- 
ences as “natural,” the current degree of regionalization is likely to be exces- 
sive, that is, welfare-reducing. 
In this paper, we have several objectives. In the first half, we extend earlier 
econometric results to gauge the effects that regional economic arrangements 
have had on bilateral trading patterns. We map out the current pattern of region- 
alization using an updated data set covering  1970-92.  We then present some 
estimates of  the role that currency links within some major groupings might 
have played in promoting intragroup trade. In the second half of the paper, we 
consider welfare effects of regional arrangements. However, we go beyond the 
analysis in Frankel, Stein, and Wei (chap. 4 in this volume), by  relaxing the 
assumption that tariffs maintained by FTA members against outsiders are exog- 
enously set. We review various political-economy arguments that others have 
made regarding how regional initiatives might either undermine movement to- 
ward more general liberalization, or help build political support for it. In other 
words, trade blocs might be stumbling blocks or they might be building blocks. 
We present a simple model of our own that illustrates one possible beneficial 
effect of trade blocs as a political building block to further trade liberalization. 
We return  to the gravity-model estimates to make a tentative  assessment on 
which of the contrasting political-economy effects of regionalism, favorable or 
unfavorable, are likely to dominate. Our tentative  verdict is favorable: those 
groupings, such as the EC and East Asia, that have increased trade dispropor- 
tionately  with each other, have at the  same time  increased  trade  with  non- 
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7.2  Our Latest Estimates of the Regionalization of Trade with a 
Modified Gravity Model 
Economists often say that inferences  should be based on what people do 
rather than what people say. In terms of regionalization  of trade blocs and 
currency blocs, there can be discrepancies between regional blocs on paper 
and trade and financial integration in reality. In history, there have been many 
formal proclamations of FTAs that have not been followed by full implementa- 
tion. In the 1960s and 1970s, announced groupings that did not turn out to live 
up to their advanced billing included ASEAN, the Latin American Free Trade 
Area (LAFTA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECO- 
WAS, launched in 1975), among many others. There is often a failure to trans- 
late  generalities  into  specifics,  to  keep  to  timetables,  and  to  enforce 
agreements. 
On the flip side of the coin, there are reasons to suspect that important de 
facto trade blocs can arise even in the absence of de jure trading arrangements. 
For example, it is often claimed that an implicit trade bloc (sometimes called 
a “yen bloc”) is forming in Asia and the Pacific, although the countries in the 
region have very few explicit preferential trade agreements. 
7.2.1  A Modified Gravity Model 
To estimate the effect of regional blocs on trade pattern, it is useful to have a 
framework that defines a “norm” of bilateral trade volume based on economic, 
geographic, and cultural factors. The gravity model is the framework that is 
most often used. Once the norm has been established, dummy variables can be 
used to check for biases, that is, for policies that member countries of a bloc 
may  use to concentrate  trade among themselves and away from the rest of 
the world. 
In this paper, we estimate a modified version of the gravity model. To ex- 
plain bilateral trade between a country and a specific trading partner, it incor- 
porates the distance of each country from its average trading partner (which 
we call remoteness), in addition to the direct bilateral distance. This extension 
of the basic gravity formulation is based in part on a new formulation in Dear- 
dorff (chap. 1 in this volume). To our knowledge, this has not been done in the 
empirical literature. For an illustration of conventional gravity-model specifi- 
cation, readers are referred to the earlier papers. 
Some other features distinguish the empirical estimation here from those in 
our earlier papers. First, the dependent variable here is country  i’s exports to 
countryj, rather than their total trade (exports plus imports). This allows one 
to estimate different income elasticities for exports and imports. Second, we 
examine groups that have (eventually) agreed to a formal regional trading ar- 
rangement, such as the EC or Mercosur, rather than continent-based groupings 
that may not have had an explicit preferential agreement. Third, we update the 
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A representative specification is 
log (Export,J)  = a  + p, log (GNP,)  + P2  log (GNP,) 
+ P, log (GNP/popJ + P,  log (GNPlpr,p,) 
+ P,  log (Distance,J) 
+ P,  log (Overall Distance,) 
+ P,  log (Overall DistanceJ) 
+ p,  (ADJACENCY) + P,  (LANGUAGE) 
+ y, iEC-I,J) + y2  (MERCOSUR-IIJ) 
+ y3  + uU. 
The GNPs and  bilateral  distance  are  standard gravity  variables.  Per  capita 
GNPs, an ADJACENCY dummy for country pairs sharing a common land bor- 
der, and a LANGUAGE dummy for countries with linguistic or colonial ties 
have been found to be useful in previous work. 
The remoteness,  or “overall  distance,”  variable  measures  how  far an ex- 
porting  (or importing) country is from all other countries. It is a measure of 
remoteness. An exporter’s remoteness is its average distance from its trading 
partners,  using partners’  GNPs as the weights. An importer’s remoteness is 
defined analogously. The hypothesis is that the remoteness of an exporter from 
the rest of the world has a positive effect on trade volume. An  example will 
illustrate the intuition. Assume that the distance between Australia and New 
Zealand is the same as the distance between  Spain and  Sweden. Spain and 
Sweden have lots of other natural trading partners close at hand, but Australia 
and New Zealand do not. One might thus expect the antipodean pair, who have 
less in the way  of  alternatives, to trade more with each other, holding other 
influences constant, than the European pair. The idea is that it is not just the 
absolute level of bilateral distance that matters, but also bilateral distance ex- 
pressed relative to the distances of each of the pair from their other partners. 
The last  three  explanatory  factors  are regional  dummies.  EC  (European 
Community), MERCOSUR (customs union of the Southern Cone countries in 
South America), and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are ex- 
amples of the dummy variables we use when testing the effects of membership 
in a common regional grouping. 
7.2.2  Data and Definition of the Regional Bloc Dummies 
Our data set covers sixty-three countries (or, in principle, 3,906 exporter- 
importer pairs) for 1970, 1980, 1990, and  1992. The source is the United Na- 
tions trade matrix for 1970 and 1980, and the International Monetary Fund‘s 
Direction of  Trade Statistics for 1990 and 1992. 
In this paper,  we focus on  six regional  groupings that by  the  end of the 
sample have set up a preferential arrangement among member countries. They 
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Andean Group, and ASEAN. Some blocs went into effect only toward the end 
of  our sample. For example, the Andean Group was formally revived during 
1989-90.  Mercosur was established in spring 1991. In order to track the evolu- 
tion of the trade pattern of these blocs, and to maintain comparability of coef- 
ficient estimates, we include the same set of regional dummies in every year. 
Hence, Mercosur dummy appears in regressions  for  1970, 1980, and  1990, 
even though it had not yet come into existence. Similarly, we define the EC 
bloc as comprising twelve countries throughout our sample, even though the 
membership of  the EC expanded three times during the sample (from six to 
nine in 1973, adding Greece in 1981, and adding Portugal and Spain in 1986). 
Again for comparability of coefficient estimates, we restrict regressions on 
the subsample of the data for which observations for the same country pairs 
are available in each of the four years. As a result, we have 2,699 observations 
every year. 
For every regional  bloc, we define two dummies. For example, ASEAN-I 
takes the value of one for exports from one ASEAN member to another, and 
zero  otherwise.  ASEAN-N  assumes  the  value  of  one  for  imports  by  any 
ASEAN member from any non-ASEAN member, and zero otherwise. The co- 
efficient on ASEAN-I  describes the degree to which ASEAN countries concen- 
trate their trade among themselves beyond what can be expected from their 
economic and geographic characteristics. We call this “intra-ASEAN bias” for 
short. The coefficient on ASEAN-N  reveals the extent to which ASEAN mem- 
bers may underimport or overimport from the rest of the world relative to the 
prediction of the gravity model. We call this “ASEAN’s extrabloc openness.” 
7.2.3  Intrabloc Bias and Extrabloc Openness 
The basic results are reported in table 7.1. We first note that the conventional 
gravity variables behave very much the same way as the model predicts and as 
in our previous  studies. The coefficients  on exporters’ and importers’ GNPs 
are  about 0.9 and  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  larger  economies 
trade more, but trade increases less than proportionally as GNP expands. Per 
capita GNP also has a positive and statistically significant coefficient: richer 
economies trade more. Bilateral distance has an economically and statistically 
large effect on trade: as distance increases by  1 percent, trade declines by 0.9 
percent. The coefficient  for ADJACENCY dummy  shows that two countries 
with a common land border have a larger amount of trade than two otherwise 
identical countries, although the difference was not  significant in  1970 and 
1980. A common language or past colonial connection facilitates trade. In our 
estimates, this brings in 30 to 60 percent more trade than otherwise. 
Of particular interest are the coefficient estimates on the remoteness vari- 
ables. The coefficient on the exporter’s remoteness is always positive and, three 
out of  four times, statistically significant. Other things equal, if country Z is 
farther from the rest of the world than country S by 1 percent, then Z’s exports 
to a common third country, say A, will be higher than that of  S by 0.3-0.6 Table 7.1  Trade Blocs and Openness: Gravity Estimation with GNP-Weighted 
Relative Distance Measures 
1970  1980  1990  1992 
GNP, 
GNP, 
Per capita GNPr 
Per capita GNP, 
Bilateral distance,, 


















Dependent Variable: log (Exports from i toj) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept estimates are not reported. All variables except 
the dummies are in logarithmic form. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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percent. Another way of stating this result is to break down the coefficient on 
bilateral distance (0.9), into an effect of bilateral distance relative to the aver- 
age distance of  the exporter (0.3 to 0.6) plus an effect an absolute distance 
effect (0.6 to 0.3). 
The coefficient on the importer’s remoteness is consistently negative, sur- 
prisingly, and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Apparently, if Z’s 
average distance from the world is greater than S by 1 percent, then Z’s imports 
from M, other things equal, is less than S by 0.4-0.8  percent. We have not yet 
figured out why this might be. 
Our central focus is estimates of intrabloc bias and extrabloc openness. We 
discuss them bloc by bloc. Notice that for a regional bloc with a small number 
of members, intrabloc bias is estimated imprecisely (i.e., with a large standard 
error), while extrabloc openness can be estimated more accurately. For ex- 
ample, the Mercosur group has four members. The dummy for intrabloc bias, 
MERCOSUR-I,  takes the value of one only for 6 exporter-importer pairs and 
zero for the remaining 3,900 pairs. On the other hand, the dummy describing 
the  bloc’s  openness  with  respect  to  imports  from  nonmember  countries, 
MERCOSUR-N,  assumes the value of one 236 times. We have to bear in mind 
the relative preciseness of the estimates in the subsequent discussions. 
The coefficients on  EC-N  are positive in every single year, suggesting that 
EC countries on average have low trade barriers so that their imports from the 
rest of the world are higher than the prediction of the modified gravity model. 
In terms of time trend, however, EC’s extrabloc openness appears to have de- 
clined over the sample. The EC’s imports from the rest of the world used to be 
higher than the gravity-model prediction by 40 percent. But that shrank to 26 
percent in 1980 and eventually to zero by the early 1990s. 
Similarly, the year-by-year point estimates of the EC bloc effect and their 
dynamics tell an interesting story. In terms of levels, within-EC trade has al- 
ways been below the prediction of the gravity model. In terms of trend, how- 
ever, the degree of within-EC bias has clearly risen. This suggests that while 
the European countries were more open to trade than many countries, for his- 
torical or other reasons, their trade pattern exhibits evidence of increasing bias 
among members and increasing trade diversion away from member countries. 
EFTA countries, in contrast to the members of the EC, appear to import less 
from the rest of the world than the gravity-model prediction in every single 
year. Trade among these countries seems below what one would have expected 
based on their economic, geographic, and linguistic linkages, although the dif- 
ference is not statistically significant. EFTA’s  extrabloc openness appears to 
diminish over time (from -  18 percent in 1970, to -44  percent in 1980, and 
to -75  percent in 1992). 
The United States and Canada imported less from the rest of the world in 
1970 than the model’s prediction. However, there has been a general trend in- 
crease in the degree of openness of these two economies to imports from other 
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nificant  -46  percent in 1970, to a statistically insignificant -  17 percent in 
1992. Judging from the point estimates, there was a slight reduction in open- 
ness from 1990 to 1992, possibly reflecting the effect of the U.S.-Canada free 
trade agreement implemented in 1989, although both estimates are not differ- 
ent from zero at the 10 percent level. 
The four South American countries that constitute Mercosur  traded more 
intensely among themselves than the gravity-model prediction, as judged from 
the estimates for the MERCOSUR-I  variable. There appears to have been an 
increase in the intragroup trade intensity in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other 
hand, during the same two-decade period, there also seems to have been an 
increase in the group’s general openness to other countries’ products. Hence, 
at least some modest across-the-board liberalization may have been undertaken 
at the same time as these countries expanded their trade to each other. 
The Andean Group, the other major set of  South American countries, also 
appears to show a certain degree of intragroup trade bias. On the other hand, 
their imports from the rest of the world were roughly in accordance with the 
gravity-model prediction. It is worth noting the jump in the extrabloc openness 
coefficient from essentially zero in 1990 to 25 percent in 1992. This suggests 
that these countries had an effective trade  liberalization program during the 
period when they started to revive the slumbering regional association. 
As a check for robustness, we have computed overall distance for exporters 
and importers as equally weighted distance from their trade partners. Gravity 
estimations with these measures are reported in table 7.2. As far as extrabloc 
openness and intrabloc bias are concerned, the qualitative features of the new 
estimates are similar to those in table 7.1. Thus, we omit detailed discussion. 
Finally, we come to ASEAN, the only explicit regional trading arrangement 
among Asian countries in the sample. We note first that the intra-ASEAN trade 
bias is positive and significant in every year. However, the bias appears to be 
diminishing in the last decade, from 2.85 in  1980 to  1.80 in  1992. Second, 
ASEAN  countries are far more open to the  world than  an average country, 
based on their economic, geographic, and cultural linkages. For example, in 
1980, the imports by the ASEAN countries from the rest of the world were 1  16 
percent (= exp (.77)  ~  1) higher than the prediction of the gravity model. The 
1991 decision to form an ASEAN FTA could conceivably be related to a slight 
(insignificant)  drop in openness from  1990 to  1992. But ASEAN  countries 
were still more open in 1992 than they were in 1980. 
To summarize this section, a large number of regional blocs in the sample 
show positive openness to trade with outsiders. When countries choose to lib- 
eralize their trade with their neighbors, it may also facilitate multilateral liber- 
alization. This is particularly possible for regional blocs  in Asia and South 
America. But the results are mixed. For example, there are significant trade- 
diversion effects for EFTA. Thus regionalism may in some cases not lead to 
more general liberalization. We will examine the arguments in more detail in 
a later section. Table 7.2  Trade Blocs and Openness: Gravity Estimation with Equally 
Weighted Relative Distance Measures 
1970  1980  1990  1992 
GNP, 
GNP, 
Per capita GNP, 
Per capita GNP, 
Bilateral distance,, 
Remoteness of  i 




























































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Intercept estimates are not reported. All variables except 
the dummies are in logarithmic form. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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7.3  The Regionalization of Currencies and Its Effect on Trade 
In this section, we consider the possibility that currency links contribute to 
bilateral trade patterns. We show that bilateral exchange rates have been par- 
tially stabilized within the two major blocs, but that the effects on trade have 
been fairly small. Thus little of  the intrabloc trade links estimated in the pre- 
ceding section can be attributed to the intrabloc currency links. 
7.3.1  Stabilization of Exchange Rates within the Blocs 
It  is  instructive  to  look  at  statistics on  the  variability  of  exchange rates 
among various groupings of countries. Worldwide, monthly real exchange rate 
variability rose in the 1980s, from a standard deviation of 3.22 percent in 1980 
to 6.98 percent in  1990. The latter figure suggests that, for a typical  pair of 
countries, approximately  95 percent  of  monthly  exchange rate  changes  are 
smaller than 14 percent (under the simplifying assumption of a log-normal dis- 
tribution). 
There is a tendency for nominal exchange rate variability to be lower within 
most of  the groups than across groups, supporting the idea of currency blocs. 
These statistics are reported in table 7.3. The lowest variability occurs within 
Europe. The 1980 statistic is a monthly standard deviation of 2 percent, and it 
falls by half during the course of the decade. Even though the members of  the 
EC correspond  roughly  to the members  of  the European  Monetary  System 
(EMS),' non-EC members in Europe show as much stability in exchange rates 
(both vis-8-vis themselves and vis-8-vis other European countries) as EC mem- 
bers. These results no doubt in part reflect that the United Kingdom and the 
Mediterranean countries have not been consistent members of  the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism, especially not within the narrow margins that the others ob- 
served until  1993. But it also reflects that such countries as Austria are loyal 
members of the currency club de facto, even though they are not yet in that 
club de jure. 
One way  that countries in a given area could achieve the observed lower 
levels of intraregional bilateral exchange rate variability is to link their curren- 
cies to the single most important currency in the region. In a simple version of 
the currency-bloc hypothesis, one would expect that the dollar has dominant 
influence in the Western Hemisphere, the yen in East Asia, and the mark in 
Europe. In Frankel and Wei (1994b), we examine the influences that the most 
important international currencies have on the determination of the values of 
currencies of  smaller countries, by  estimating implicit weights in a currency 
basket benchmark. Unsurprisingly, the mark has the overwhelmingly dominant 
weight in determining the value of most European currencies. In the Western 
Hemisphere, most of the countries tested give dominant weight to the dollar. 
1. Of  the EC members, only Greece had  not joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism by  early 
1992 (though Italy and England dropped out soon thereafter). Table 7.3  Mean Volatility of Monthly Real and Nominal Exchange Rates 
Entire World (63 countries) 
Real Rate  Nominal Rate 
Observations  1,08  1  1.770 
1965  0.042075  0.028132 
I970  0.029120  0.01  9186 
I975  0.044608  0.036175 
1980  0.032227  0.03 1364 
1985  0.080961  0.072245 
1990  0.069847  0.077298 
Western Hemisphere 
Among Members  With the Rest of  the World 
Real Rate  Nominal Rate  Real Rate  Nominal Rate 
Observations  78 
1965  0.087273 
1970  0.056393 
1975  0.064088 
1980  0.030026 
1985  0.16410 





0.02  1343 
0.17915 















European Economic Community (predecessor of  the European Union) 
Among Members  With the Rest of the World 
Real Rate  Nominal Rate  Real Rate  Nominal Rate 
Observations  45  55  370  539 
1965  0.017975  0.0013808  0.033617  0.01 8203 
1970  0.0 1352  1  0.0077273  0.023547  0.014857 
1975  0.023947  0.018182  0.039339  0.032903 
1980  0.020350  0.017834  0.032199  0.03 1967 
1985  0.01  91 7  1  0.01  6586  0.064494  0.058641 
1990  0.012036  0.0097418  0.055230  0.059050 
~~ 
East Asia (EAEC) 
Among Members  With the Rest of the World 
Real Rate  Nominal Rate  Real Rate  Nominal Rate 
Observations  3  21  172  416 
1965  0.0 16960  0.041700  0.029392  0.031197 
0.058080  0.026516  0.035399  0.020715  1970 
1975  0.025727  0.026994  0.035500  0.032326 
1980  0.030570  0.026914  0.029284  0.028659 
1985  0.047970  0.034891  0.0646 16  0.05785 I 
1990  0.033250  0.019260  0.060240  0.058726 
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Table 7.3  (continued) 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) 
Among Members  With the Rest of the World 
Real Rate  Nominal Rate  Real Rate  Nominal Rate 
Observations  28  66  312  576 
1965  0.008594  0.024897  0.029889  0.0267 18 
1970  0.025547  0.0 I7227  0.027609  0.018375 
1975  0.029604  0.02885  1  0.038648  0.033309 
1980  0.019988  0.021441  0.028438  0.027949 
1985  0.045946  0.038942  0.067632  0.060800 
1990  0.035360  0.026978  0.058762  0.060894 
Nuresr  Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of  the first  difference of  the logs of  the 
monthly exchange rate over the current and preceding years (24 months). To ensure comparability 
over time, all computations are performed over country pairs that have nonmissing values through- 
out 1965-90. 
The pattern of linking to the major currency of the region  is broken in East 
Asia, however. The weight on the dollar is very high in most East Asian coun- 
tries, with no special role for the yen. The Japanese currency is statistically 
significant in Singapore, and occasionally in some of the other countries in the 
region, but the coefficient is low. Each of the Asian countries is more properly 
classed in a dollar bloc than in a yen bloc. It thus appears that there are not 
three currency blocs in the world, but two: a mark bloc in Europe and a dollar 
bloc in the Pacific. 
7.3.2  An Attempt to Estimate the Effect of Exchange Rate Variability 
on Trade 
One rationale for a country to assign weight to a particular currency in de- 
termining its exchange rate is the assumption that a more stable bilateral ex- 
change rate will help promote bilateral trade with the partner in question. This 
is a major motivation  for exchange rate stabilization in Europe. There have 
been quite a few time-series studies of the effect of exchange rate uncertainty 
on trade overall,2 but fewer cross-section studies of bilateral trade. 
Three exceptions are Thursby and Thursby (1988) and De Grauwe (1988), 
which look only at a group of industrialized countries, and Brada and Mendez 
(1988). We will reexamine the question here using a data set that is broader, 
covering sixty-three countries. We return to a version of the gravity model of 
bilateral trade as in Frankel, Stein, and Wei (chap. 4 in this volume), but add 
an additional variable to capture the effect of exchange rate variability along- 
side the other variables. A problem of simultaneous causality should be noted 
at the outset: if exchange rate variability shows up with an apparent negative 
effect on the volume of bilateral trade, the correlation could be due to the gov- 
2. The literature is reviewed in Edison and Melvin (1990). 201  Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies 
Table 7.4  Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility: Nominal Rates 
(total trade, 1965-90) 
1965  I970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
GNP 












































































0.76*  0.76* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
0.27*  0.25* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
-0.62*  -0.71* 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
0.64*  0.73* 
(0.18)  (0.18) 
0.44*  0.34** 
(0.15)  (0.16) 
0.81*  0.60** 
(0.26)  (0.28) 
1.35*  1.21* 
(0.18)  (0.19) 
0.01  0.45** 
(0.18)  (0.18) 
(0.08)  (0.34) 
1,653  1,589 
0.72  0.74 
1.18  1.17 






















Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables except the dummies are in logarithms. 
WH2, EAEC2, APEC2, and EE2 are dummy variables for both countries belonging to the same 
bloc. For example, WH2 = 1 if both countries are in the Western Hemisphere, and 0 otherwise. 
*Significant at the 1% level (f  2 2.576). 
**Significant at the 5% level (t  2 1.96). 
***Significant at the 10% level (t 2 1.645). 
ernment’s deliberate efforts to stabilize the currency vis-8-vis a valued trading 
partner, as easily as to the effects of stabilization on trade. 
Volatility is defined to be the standard deviation of the first difference of the 
logarithmic exchange rate. We start with the volatility  of  nominal exchange 
rates and embed this term in our gravity equation. The results are reported in 
table 7.4. Table 7.5 does the same for the volatility of real exchange rates. Most 
coefficients are similar to those reported  in the earlier paper (chap. 4 in this 
volume) without exchange rate variability: the Western Hemisphere, East Asia, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the EC all show statistically 
significant bloc effects. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) show a negative effect of  exchange rate 
volatility (whether nominal or real) on bilateral trade that is highly significant 
in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. Only in 1985 and 1990 does the negative effect 
disappear (indeed, turn positive). Henceforth we concentrate our discussions 
on the regressions involving real exchange rate variability. 202  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 7.5  Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility: Real Rates (total trade, 1965-90) 
GNP 












































































































































Notes: Standard errors are  in parentheses. All variables  except  the dummies are in logarithms. 
WH2, EAEC2, APEC2, and EE2 are dummy variables for both countries belonging to the same 
bloc. For example, WH2 = 1 if both countries are in the Western Hemisphere, and 0 otherwise. 
*Significant at the 1%  level (t  2 2.576). 
**Significant at the 5% level (t 2  1.96). 
***Significant at the 10% level (f 2 1.645). 
By way of illustration, these point estimates can be used for some sample 
calculations. They suggest that if the level of EC real exchange rate variability 
that prevailed in 1980, a standard deviation of 2 percent, had been eliminated 
altogether, the volume of intra-EC trade would have increased by  14.18 percent 
(= 6.97 X 2.04). This OLS estimate should be regarded very much as an upper 
bound. For one thing, the 1980 point estimate of the effect of  exchange rate 
volatility is the largest of all the years. In the earlier observations, the magni- 
tude of the estimated effect is one-fifth to one-half the size. 
Worldwide, the average level of exchange rate variability in  1980 was 3.22 
percent. The OLS-estimated effect on trade of adopting fixed exchange rates 
worldwide was thus 22.44 percent (= 6.97 X 3.22). 
The exchange rate disruptions of  September  1992 and August  1993 may 
herald a return to the level of variability among the EMS countries that pre- 
vailed in 1980. Table 7.3 shows that this would represent an approximate dou- 
bling of the standard deviation of exchange rates, relative to the stability that 
had been achieved by  1990. What would be the predicted effects on trade? The 203  Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies 
Table 7.6  Sample Calculation of the Effects of Exchange Rate Stabilization 
by the European Union on made during 1980-90 
(upper-  bound estimate) 
Elasticity of Trade with 
Respect to Volatility 
(1980 estimate) 
Estimated Change in Trade 
due to Bilateral Currency 
Stabilization (%)  Changes in Volatility from 1980 to 1990 
Nominal exchange rate volatility 
Real exchange rate volatility 
Real exchange rate volatility 
(OLS) 0.0097 -  0.0178 = -0.0081 
(OLS) 0.0120 -  0.0204 = -0.0084 
(instrumental-variables method) 







OLS estimate in  table 7.5  suggests that  trade would  fall by  5.85 percent 
(= 6.97  X  (2.04 - 1.20)). Table 7.6 reports this calculation, and the corre- 
sponding calculations for some other possible estimates. 
Interpretations of the estimates in tables 7.4 and 7.5 are complicated by  the 
likelihood of  simultaneity bias in the above regressions. Governments may 
choose deliberately to stabilize bilateral exchange rates with their major trad- 
ing partners. This has certainly been the case in Europe. Hence, there could be 
a strong observed correlation between trade patterns and currency linkages 
even if exchange rate volatility does not depress trade. 
To address this problem, we use the method of instrumental variable estima- 
tion, with the standard deviation of relative money supply as our instrument 
for the volatility of  exchange rates. The argument in favor of  this choice of 
instrument is that relative money  supplies and bilateral exchange rates are 
highly correlated in theory (they are directly linked under the monetary theory 
of exchange rate determination), and in our data as well, but monetary policies 
are less likely than exchange rate policies to be set in response to bilateral trade 
patterns. The instrumental variables results, reported in table 7.7, show the 
same sign pattern across the years as the OLS estimates, but the negative effect 
is statistically significant only in  1965. The coefficient for 1980 is (a com- 
pletely insignificant) 0.28; even if the point estimate is taken at face value, it 
would imply that the elimination of exchange rate variability worldwide would 
increase trade by only 0.9 percent (= 0.28 X 3.22). 
These results, while less robust than most of the other gravity equation find- 
ings, are generally consistent with the hypothesis that real exchange rate vola- 
tility has depressed bilateral trade a bit in the 1960s and 1970s. But the evi- 
dence for a negative trade effect, which starts out relatively strong in  1965, 
diminishes steadily in the 1970s and 1980s, especially if one takes due account 
of  the simultaneity. The proliferation of  currency options, forward contracts, 
and other hedging instruments over this period may explain why the effect that 
appears once to have been there, has more recently disappeared. 204  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 7.7  Effect of Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Using Volatility of Relative 
Money Supply as Instrument (total trade, 1965-90) 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
GNP 































0.5  1 
I .40 
-0.17 
0.66*  0.72* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
0.33*  0.25* 
(0.04)  (0.02) 
-0.51*  -0.69* 
(0.08)  (0.05) 
0.69*  0.51* 
(0.18)  (0.20) 
0.16  0.42** 
(0.43)  (0.17) 
1.71*  0.90** 
(0.43)  (0.35) 
0.74*  1.09* 
(0.23)  (0.24) 
0.00  -0.12 
(0.18)  (0.24) 
-4.54  -2.05 
(11.73)  (1.54) 
92  1  1,076 
0.76  0.73 
































































Nores: Standard errors are in parentheses. All  variables  except  the dummies are in  logarithms. 
WH2, EAEC2, APECZ, and EE2 are dummy variables  for both countrics bclonging to thc same 
bloc. For example, WH2 = 1 if both countries are in the Western Hemisphere, and 0 otherwise. 
*Significant at the  1% level (r 2 2.576). 
**Significant at the 5% level (t 2 1.96). 
***Significant at the 10% level (t 2 1.645). 
7.4  Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks? The Political Economy of 
Regional Blocs 
Although the multilateral  system has made large strides toward freer trade, 
most recently in the form of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in December 1993, political constraints inevitably prevent the im- 
mediate attainment of the economist’s nirvana. Since some influential producer 
interest groups in each country typically  stand to lose from free trade, full 
unilateral liberalization rarely occurs, and the  world must instead await the 
outcome of step-by-step multilateral negotiations. In these negotiations, coun- 
tries  trade concessions with each other in  such a way  that  at each  step the 
percentage of the population that stands to gain is sufficiently high to overcome 
the political opposition. 
In this light, the case in favor of regional trading arrangements is a second- 
best argument that takes as given the impossibility of  further most-favored- 205  Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies 
nation  (MFN)  liberalization.  The uninitiated  might  assume  that  free trade 
economists would under these circumstances necessarily support FTAs. But 
from the standpoint of static economic welfare, trade economists are ambiva- 
lent about the desirability of FTAs. So long as tariffs and other barriers against 
third countries remain in place, the elimination of barriers between two FTA 
members can as easily intensify distortions as eliminate them.3 
The classical distinction is between the harmful trade-diverting  effects of 
FTAs and their beneficial trade-creating  effects. Although modem theories of 
trade have gone beyond the diversiodcreation distinction, it is still a useful 
intuitive guide to likely welfare effects4 Grossman and Helpman  (1995), for 
example, find in a lobbying model that an FTA is most likely to be adopted 
when  trade  diversion  outweighs trade creation,  which  unfortunately  is also 
when it is most likely to reduce aggregate welfare. 
7.4.1  Negative Political Implications for Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
There are a variety of arguments as to how the adoption of a regional trading 
area might undermine movement toward unilateral or multilateral liberaliza- 
tion for political reasons: these fall under the headings “incentive to protect” 
or market power, scarce negotiator resources, political deadend, and manipula- 
tion of the process by special interests. We consider these antiregionalization 
arguments first, before considering some arguments that go the other way. 
Blocs’ Market Power and Incentive to Protect 
The standard experiment presumes that the level of  trade barriers against 
outsiders remains unchanged when a customs union is established. However, 
Krugman (1991a) shows that, in a world consisting of a few large blocs, each 
unit will have more monopoly power and thus will be more tempted to seek to 
shift the terms of trade in its favor by  raising tariffs against the other blocs. 
This is the “incentive to protect.” This temptation will be minimized in a world 
of many small trading blocs (or in a world of MFN, i.e., each country its own 
bloc). A world of  a few large blocs is thus one in which the noncooperative 
equilibrium features a higher level of interbloc tariffs and a lower level of eco- 
nomic welfare. In Krugman’s simulation, three turns out to be the worst number 
of  blocs to have. Haveman (1992) gets essentially the same result, with ex- 
pected world welfare minimized in a world of only two customs unions, using 
a model where trade arises from comparative advantage rather than from prod- 
uct differentiation (following the Deardorff-Stern critique of Krugman). 
3. On the grounds of such trade-diversion effects, and other considerations discussed below, 
Bhagwati, Krueger, and Panagariya generally oppose regional trading arrangements. Bhagwati 
(1995, 11) and Panagariya (1995, 20, n. 8) have confessed that they were prepared to oppose the 
NAFTA publicly, if asked. They are now skeptical of other ongoing initiatives, including APEC. 
4.  Stein and Frankel (1994) show in a model of imperfect competition that a simulation compar- 
ison of the magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion provides the right answer to the ques- 
tion whether FTAs raise the welfare of the representative consumer, under many plausible parame- 
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The Krugman model assumes that members of a trade bloc set their external 
tariffs together, that is, that the arrangement is a customs union. The “incentive 
to protect” story would be different for a standard FTA, in which each country 
is able to set its tariffs independently  with respect to nonmembers.  Sinclair 
and Vines (1  994) argue that in the FTA case there is actually an incentive for 
each country to reduce its external tariffs, just the opposite of the customs 
union case. Richardson (1993a) derives the result, that is, the superiority of an 
FTA to a customs union, in a model where tariffs are set endogenously, by a 
government that seeks to maximize a function of the profits of protected indus- 
tries, in addition to consumer welfare. The FTA member with a comparative 
disadvantage in a particular good will experience a decline in the political in- 
fluence of that industry as competition within the FTA diminishes the indus- 
try’s economic size. Thus the country will tend to reduce protection for that 
industry, in a way that would not be possible if bound by the common external 
tariff of a customs union. Panagariya and Findlay (1994) assume that protec- 
tion is the endogenous outcome of lobbying, and derive the opposite results 
regarding the FTNcustoms union comparison from Richardson and Sinclair 
and Vines: the lobby chooses a lower external tariff under a customs union 
than under an FTA. The customs union is more effective at diluting the power 
of interest groups. 
In reality, governments in one sense are less capable of national economic 
optimization than the Krugman model presupposes, and in another sense they 
are more capable. In both respects, large trading blocs are less vulnerable to the 
incentive to raise tariffs against each other than under Krugman’s assumptions. 
Governments are less capable of optimization, in that maximum exploitation 
of the terms of trade (through imposition of the “optimum tariff”) is in practice 
one of the less prevalent determinants of trade policy. More commonly seen 
are arguments regarding infant industries, protecting the scarce factor of pro- 
duction, increasing employment, and adjustment costs. Governments are more 
capable of  optimization in that they have already instituted  the cooperative 
international regime of GATT, as Bergsten (1991) pointed out in his comment 
on Krugman (1991b). Article XXIV of GATT explicitly rules out Krugman’s 
concern. This provision allows deviations from the MFN principle  only for 
FTAs  or customs unions that  do not raise the average level of  their tariffs 
against nonmembers. 
There are several reasons to worry that blocs’ “incentive to protect” survives 
despite the existence of article XXIV. First, and most obviously, article XXIV 
is often disregarded, as Bhagwati (1992) reminds us. Second, as Bagwell and 
Staiger (1993, n. 25)  point out, exacerbation of the incentive to protect in cus- 
toms unions can take the form of  “gray-area’’ measures when explicit tariff 
increases are ruled out. Third, one hopes that the multilateral process is on a 
path whereby worldwide tariff rates are gradually reduced through negotiation, 
and that this path is the relevant benchmark, not unchanging tariffs. Bond and 
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agreement for interbloc liberalization  in  a repeated game, which is seen as 
GATT’s role to facilitate, becomes more difficult as the size of the blocs, and 
therefore their monopoly power, rises. 
Scarce Negotiator Resources 
The scarce-negotiator-resources  argument points out that negotiations are 
not costless. If they were, then the world would have achieved free trade by 
now. If the U.S. special trade representative is spending all his or her time- 
and spending all the White House’s political capital with Congress-on  a re- 
gional agreement (e.g., NAFTA), there is presumably less time or capital left 
over to spend on multilateral negotiations (e.g., the Uruguay Round). As with 
the incentive-to-protect argument, regional trading arrangements may set back 
the process of negotiating worldwide trade liberalization under GATT. 
Some authors-for  example, Summers (1991) and Krugman (1993)-have 
argued that the costs of negotiation go up with the number of countries in- 
volved, so that it is easier to negotiate customs unions first, and then proceed 
to multilateral liberalization among the smaller number of larger units. Others 
question the practicality of the small numbers claim-Bhagwati  (1993b), Win- 
ters (1996), and Panagariya (1994,830-3 1). 
Political Deadend 
Some have suggested political models in which regional initiatives can pre- 
vent multilateral  initiatives because the sequence of  decisions matters. The 
forces in favor of liberalization might win out over protectionists  if  the only 
choice is between the status quo and multilateral liberalization; but when of- 
fered the option of  a regional FTA, the political process might then take the 
regional  route to the exclusion  of  the multilateral  route.  Bhagwati  (1993b, 
28-29)  worries that businessmen  and bureaucrats,  after having achieved re- 
gional integration, might then find the effort involved in multilateral negotia- 
tion too difficult. “Lobbying support and political energies can readily be di- 
verted to preferential trading arrangements such as FTAs. . . .  That deprives the 
multilateral system of the support it needs to survive, let alone be conducive to 
further trade liberalization” (Bhagwati 1993a, 162). 
Levy (1993) offers what might be called a median-voter deadend model, in 
which a bilateral free trade agreement can undermine support for multilateral 
liberalization because it is a deadend in the political process. It is assumed that 
trade policy is determined by the median voter. Trade itself is determined in 
some sectors by differences in factor endowments, and in others by considera- 
tions of imperfect substitutes. As others have argued, the intraindustry sort of 
trade that is generated in imperfect substitutes is easier to accept politically 
than the factor-endowment kind of trade. The reason is that adjustment to im- 
port competition requires workers only to move from the assembly line for one 
product variety to the assembly line for another variety of the same product. 
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accept politically, because it requires workers in previously  protected indus- 
tries to move to different industries (and at lower wages, in the case of capital- 
intensive industrialized countries). 
Levy argues that policy toward trade is thus always a trade-off between the 
gains afforded by  increased varieties  and the losses inflicted by  a fall in the 
relative price of  the  product that  is intensive  in the  scarce factor  (labor, in 
the case of industrialized countries). If liberalization is not attainable, it is be- 
cause the losses from factor-endowment trade dominate. If a vote is held first 
on whether to join a bilateral FTA, the proposition is more likely to pass when 
the potential partner has similar factor endowments. (It is easier politically to 
achieve an EU than  a NAFTA or APEC.) The reason is that the gains from 
increased trade in imperfect substitutes will be large, while the losses from a 
fall in the relative price of labor-intensive products will be small. But if a vote 
is then  held on multilateral liberalization, it will fail: those key  sectors that 
stand to profit from trade in  imperfect  substitutes will  already have reaped 
those gains, and there will be fewer political forces to countervail the sectors 
that lose from the additional factor-endowment trade. In this way regional free 
trade agreements undermine political support for multilateral  liberalization in 
this model. 
Manipulation by Speciul Interests 
The special-interests argument points out that the process of  instituting a 
regional  trading  arrangement  features  abundant  opportunities  for  trade- 
sensitive industries to manipulate the process, particularly those sectors that 
might be adversely  affected.  Examples  abound.  First, Wonnacott  and  Lutz 
(1  989, 65-66)  emphasize that negotiators frequently seek to exclude from re- 
gional FTAs precisely those of their sectors that would be most threatened by 
welfare-enhancing trade creation. The members of ASEAN, for example, have 
until now exempted almost all the important sectors from the system of prefer- 
ences that they are supposed to grant each other (Panagariya 1994, 828-29). 
Grossman and Helpman  (1  995, 680-87)  have used their lobbying model to 
understand  how  the  possibility  of  such  industry  exclusions  increases  the 
chances of FTAs being adopted. This was the primary reason for another re- 
striction that GATT article XXIV places on FTAs, that “substantially all” barri- 
ers within the region be removed. In practice, FTAs have tended to comply less 
than completely with this provision. Examples include the European Economic 
Community’s exclusion of agriculture and, in practice, steel and many other 
goods. 
Second,  Anne Krueger (in press, 1995) emphasizes the exploitation of rules 
of origin. An  FTA, unlike  a customs union,  does not involve the  setting of 
common external tariffs. Rules of origin are a mechanism by which a country 
can prevent imports from nonmembers, transshipped via the FTA partner, in 
those sectors where the partner has lower tariffs. Richardson (1993b), Krueger 
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the FTA negotiation  can enhance the extent of  protection they receive when 
their governments use rules of origin to enable them to capture their FTA part- 
ner’s market in addition to their own, thus diverting trade from foreign suppli- 
ers. Richardson (1993b) emphasizes that prices at which producers can sell are 
equalized within an FTA, even when rules of origin are successful in keeping 
the consumer price higher in the higher-tariff country.s Krueger (1993, on the 
other hand, argues that customs unions are always Pareto superior to FTAs, 
because they have no rules of origin that can be exploited in this way. 
Bhagwati (1993b, 30-31;  1995,22) and Panagariya (1995,16-21)  point out 
that large countries like the United States may  use their overwhelming  bar- 
gaining power within regional groupings to obtain from small countries dis- 
torting concessions that they might not obtain in more balanced multilateral 
negotiations. Perroni and Whalley (1994) and Whalley (chap. 3 in this volume) 
point  out that  small countries have been  the  supplicants  in  recent regional 
agreements, and show how large countries have all the bargaining power on 
their side. 
7.4.2  Positive Political Implications for Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
Other arguments go the other way. They offer the hope that the adoption of a 
regional trading area might undermine protectionism and reinforce movement 
toward liberalization more generally. The arguments concern locking in unilat- 
eral liberalization, the efficiency of negotiating with larger units, mobilization 
of regional solidarity, building export constituencies to create domestic politi- 
cal momentum, and competitive liberalization. 
Lock-in and Mobilizing Regional Solidarity 
In the late 1980s, Mexican president Salinas reversed a half century of Mexi- 
can protectionism  and imposed  sweeping unilateral liberalization measures. 
Future presidents of Mexico might seek to reverse this liberalization. Thus, a 
good argument for NAFTA was that it locked in the Salinas reforms in a man- 
ner that would be difficult to reverse in the future (e.g., Lawrence 1991). 
Elsewhere, such as in Andean Pact countries, leaders have used popular sup- 
port for regional  solidarity to achieve liberalization that would be politically 
impossible if pursued unilaterally. De Melo, Panagariya,  and Rodrik (1993, 
section 3) model the process whereby governments can adopt rules or institu- 
tions in a regional  grouping to insulate themselves from pressure by private- 
sector lobbies for intervention on their behalf. 
Eflciency of Negotiating with Larger Units 
Within the context of  multilateral negotiations, it is awkward to negotiate 
separately with over a hundred small countries. It has been argued that if small 
5. Competition for tariff revenue among the FTA  members may then result in an equilibrium 
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countries form themselves into larger groupings, which presumably have to be 
customs unions with common external trade policies, then they can negotiate 
as a group.h This is thought to increase the efficiency of the negotiations, and 
to make a satisfactory worldwide agreement more likely. The EU is certainly 
the  most important example of  this. Other groupings,  such as ASEAN  and 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), have also been 
urged to integrate regionally, so as to be able to talk with the larger powers. 
Competitive Liberalization 
In an important analysis of the political  economy  of  regional blocs, Oye 
(1992) argues that the expected costs of exclusion from groupings change the 
political  dynamics, by  strengthening the antiprotectionist constituencies  do- 
mestically,  so as to draw  countries  into multilateral  negotiations.  Whereas 
many authors might read the recent experience as regionalism helping build 
support for multilateral liberalization, Oye finds that this was also true of the 
1930s experience. 
“Competitive liberalization” refers to building political momentum for lib- 
eralization among countries, rather than domestically (Bergsten 1995). An il- 
lustration  is President  Clinton’s “triple play”  of  late  1993 (Bergsten  1994, 
18-20;  Kahler 1994, 19,25). By upgrading the Seattle meeting of APEC min- 
isters that had been scheduled for November  1993 into a high-profile leaders’ 
meeting, he signaled to the Europeans that if they continued to allow French 
farmers to hold up the Uruguay Round, other countries might proceed without 
them. This message carried credibility because of its fortunate timing, coming 
as it did on the heels of the hard-fought approval of NAFTA in the U.S. Con- 
gress. Thus, the NAFTA outcome demonstrated the political will necessary for 
meaningful agreements, while the APEC meeting demonstrated the possibility 
that agreements would cover a fraction of the world economy that was suffi- 
ciently large and dynamic to give the Europeans cause for worry at the pros- 
pect of being left out. German policymakers have reportedly confirmed that 
this was part of their motive for concluding the Uruguay Round in December. 
In this episode at least, it appears that regional initiatives helped bring about 
multilateral agreement. 
Of  course, the game need not always come out so well. The trouble with 
making credible threats is that sometimes they must be carried out. The process 
that is traditionally feared is competitive regionalization, where the formation 
of  one regional grouping puts pressure on other countries to form a bloc of 
their own, rather than to liberalize unilaterally or multilaterally. The worst situ- 
ation for a country is to be one of  the few that do not belong to any bloc, 
because the terms of trade then turn against it. For this reason, there is a danger 
6. E.g., Deardorff and Stem (1994), Krugman (1993), and  Summers (1991). Kahler (1994) 
suggests that plurilateral negotiations among a small number of regional neighbors may  allow 
more efficient treatment of new individual issue areas than do global negotiations. 211  Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies 
that the world will become stuck in a Nash noncooperative equilibrium of sev- 
eral continental FTAs: each continent forms an FTA because, given that the 
next continent is doing so, it will be hurt if it does not respond in kind. In the 
resulting equilibrium, all are worse off than they were under the status quo of 
MFN. (Hence the argument for discouraging ETAS  in GATT in the first place, 
as under article XXIV.) Furthermore, even if continents are allowed to choose 
the level of intrabloc preference to maximize their individual welfares, rather 
than being constrained to go all the way to FTAs, in equilibrium they will still 
choose a level of preference that is so high as to leave everyone worse off. This 
is the “incentive to protect” argument we have already seen. These points are 
shown in a model with intercontinental transport costs by Stein (1994,83-93).’ 
On the other hand, since the ultimate goal is worldwide free trade, it is not 
clear that the ultimate political-economy dynamic is bad. Worldwide economic 
welfare  is  so reduced  by  a noncooperative  equilibrium  of  four continental 
FTAs that it may then become politically possible for them to agree multilater- 
ally to remove the barriers that remain between them and go to worldwide free 
trade. This would seem to follow if the obstacle to a move from MFN to world- 
wide free trade is a moderate fixed resource cost to negotiations (say 1 percent 
of GDP, to buy off producers that stand to lose). The leap to free trade would 
be all the more likely to follow if the resource cost to negotiation increases 
with the number of  distinct entities involved. 
What happens if the first bloc allows other countries to join? (This is one 
possible interpretation of the phrase “open regionalism.”) A number of authors 
have shown that nonmember countries will, one by one, find it in their interest 
to join a given FTA.* While the bloc expands, its members gain progressively, 
as the terms of trade are shifted further and further in their favor. Those that 
continue to be left out lose progressively. In the model of Deardorff and Stern 
(1994), the bloc continues to grow until it encompasses the whole world, the 
happy outcome of  global free trade. Their model, however, assumes that the 
bloc at each stage places prohibitive tariffs on outsiders, a rather extreme as- 
sumption. 
Saxonhouse  (1993)  and  Stein  (1994)  consider  the  same problem,  while 
allowing trade with nonmembers. They find that when the bloc reaches a cer- 
tain size (20 out of 30 members in Saxonhouse, and 16 out of 30 in Stein), it 
will choose not to accept any new members, because its own welfare starts to 
decline after that. What makes this story especially alarming from the view- 
point of  ultimate multilateral liberalization is that the single bloc is truly  a 
7. In a simulation, the status quo of  MFN features worldwide welfare that falls short of  free 
trade by only about 0.5 percent of GNP (which may not be enough to overcome negotiating costs). 
Each continent in sequence has an incentive to form an FTA, raising its welfare but lowering that 
of all the other continents, until all four have done so. In that noncooperative equilibrium, the loss 
relative to global free trade is about 2.5 percent. 
8. Bond and Syropoulos (1996), Deardorff and Stem (1994), Saxonhouse (1993), and  Stein 
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deadend: welfare of the bloc members is higher than it would be under world- 
wide free trade, so that they have an incentive to reject multilateral liberaliza- 
tion that they did not have when the alternative was MFN. At this unhappy 
deadend point, worldwide welfare is close to its minimum, the very low wel- 
fare of the nonmembers outweighing the high welfare of the members. 
At some point, the nonmembers will presumably  wise up and form a bloc 
of their own. But given two competing blocs, the incentive for individual coun- 
tries will be to join the larger of the two to share in its monopoly  power. A 
world of  two equal-sized blocs is unstable  (Bond and Syropoulos 1996). A 
simulation  in  Stein (1994, 99-102)  shows  that  the  stable  equilibrium has 
twenty-six out of thirty countries in one large bloc, and four in the other. Again, 
the large bloc has no incentive to take mercy on those excluded. 
Stein (1994,  103-5)  has a proposed  solution to this difficulty: that article 
XXIV be amended to state that preferences within a bloc cannot go beyond a 
specified low level (22  percent is the magic limit, in his simulation). We have 
already seen (in the Frankel-Stein-Wei model) that such a restriction-the  op- 
posite of  the current article XXIV requirement for 100 percent preferences- 
would be welfare-improving in a world of equal-sized continental blocs. The 
same is true when there are no intercontinental transport costs and there is a 
temptation for countries to join the larger of two blocs. The equilibrium  still 
features one large bloc (twenty-four countries) and one small (six countries). 
But with the limit on the margin of preferences  in place, the large bloc has 
nothing to lose by moving to worldwide free trade, so that the happy outcome 
is still ultimately attainable. Of course the members of the large bloc would 
vote against such a rule in GATT. However, if the issue is decided before any 
single incipient grouping is large enough to know that it will be the dominant 
bloc, then everything will work out for free trade. 
7.5  A Simple Political-Economy Model 
In this section, we sketch a simple political-economy model of our own that 
illustrates  another potentially  beneficial role that regional  blocs can play  to 
promote further trade liberalization. A fuller version can be found in Wei and 
Frankel  (1996). We  set up the model  using  the structure in Fernandez  and 
Rodrik (1991). By construction,  global free trade is not obtainable directly in 
a political process. We then show how a regional initiative may break this im- 
passe. The essential  argument  is  isomorphic  to that  of  Wei  (forthcoming), 
which illustrates some political-economy  benefits of gradualist reforms over 
big bang in transition economies. 
Consider a two-period world. Countries A and B are two small open econo- 
mies. The rest of the world is labeled country C. There are three goods, x, y, 
and z. All can be produced by a constant-returns-to-scale  (CRTS) technology 
with labor being the only input. Specifically, for country k, the technology to 
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where k = A, B, and C, and j = x, y,  and z. 
To minimize notational complication while still preserving enough richness 
for our discussion, we will assume that the technology parameter 8  takes one 
of two values. 
T; = a,  if (k,  j)  = (A, x), (B,  y). or (C,  z); 
= p  otherwise, 
where a  < p and the index (k,  j)  represents the value of unit labor requirement 
for good k in country j. 
Trade policy decisions are made by majority vote. The labor distribution in 
countries A and B has the feature that no single sector has a majority, and the 
sum of any two sectors constitutes a majority. For example, the labor force can 
be evenly divided among the three sectors. On the other hand, in country C 
(i.e., the aggregation of all the other countries in the world), workers in sector 
z constitute a majority. Hence, country C always wants global free trade if it 
can get it. This assumption on country C allows us to focus our discussion on 
countries A and B. 
7.5.1 
With this configuration, each country has an unambiguous winner (e.g., sec- 
tor x for A). Suppose that in countries A and B the two less efficient sectors 
receive  tariff  protection  at the ad valorem rate  r. Because of the  symmetry 
between the two countries, we restrict our attention to one, say A. Trusting it 
will not lead to confusion, we omit the country superscript for all variables. 
Assume perfect competition  in each sector. The constant returns to scale 
technology ties down the wage rates to the cum-tariff goods prices. That is, 
Global Free Trade Is Infeasible 
WJ = pp,. 
By appropriately choosing the values of 0,  we can let the wages be the same 
in the three sectors in the absence of any change in the status quo. From the 
viewpoint of country A, global free trade means removal of tariffs on goods y 
and z. With the removal of the two tariffs, wy and wz fall. 
The crucial assumption of the model is that job relocation is costly. The cost 
is individual-specific. But individuals do not know their own switching costs 
before  the trade liberalization takes place. All they know  is the probability 
distribution of the costs. We use c, to denote the cost for individual i of switch- 
ing from one sector to another. 
With this setup, it is easy to demonstrate the following possibility using the 
Fernandez-Rodrik (1991) argument. On the one hand, global free trade will 
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On the other hand, a (different) majority  will oppose it ex ante. Those who 
oppose it do it rationally, as the expected loss from free trade may outweigh 
the expected gain. (See Wei and Frankel 1996 for a more detailed exposition.) 
7.5.2  Regional Bloc Is Feasible 
Consider a proposal to form an FTA between A and B. Ex post, as a result 
of tariff removal, the price of good y in country A (and that of good x in country 
B) will decline. Not surprisingly, people in sector x in country A unambigu- 
ously benefit from this and will support the regional bloc. Interestingly, people 
in sector z also benefit from a lower price on good y.  Hence, if they base their 
action on this period’s utility, they will also support the move, which makes the 
number of supporters in country A a majority. 
7.5.3  Global Free Trade Reconsidered 
Once a free trade bloc with country  B is in place, we can reconsider the 
political feasibility  of a proposal  for global free trade. Those people who re- 
main in sector y, although suffering a real income loss from the regional bloc, 
realize that further liberalization, as under a global free trade agreement, will 
not cause another drop in their wage; rather it will lead to a drop in the price 
of  good z. Therefore, people in sector y together with those in sector x will 
now collectively support a move to global free trade. 
Note, to be completely correct, that this analysis assumes voters are myopic 
in the sense that, when voting on the regional bloc, they ignore the prospect of 
a future vote on global free trade. However, the behavior can be rational, if the 
voters have a high discount rate or there is uncertainty about the future (for 
example, about whether there is going to be a second vote at all), so that the 
expected future loss would be sufficiently  small relative to the current gain 
from the regional deal. 
The behavior can also be rational in an alternative setting. Assume, instead 
of having a forever-young population, we have successive generations in each 
country. Assume further that each period (appropriately defined) is dominated 
by  a different generation, and there is little intergenerational altruism. Then, 
the referenda on the regional bloc and global free trade take place in different 
generations. Each  will  succeed politically exactly in the way  as delineated 
above. 
7.5.4 
In our above story, a regional bloc works as a stepping stone toward global 
free trade under several scenarios, including a high discount rate and indepen- 
dent generations. Does the result hold without these assumptions? In particu- 
lar, if people in sector z realize that free trade with B will lead to free trade 
with C, or the tariff on z will eventually be removed, would they still support 
the regional trade arrangement? 
We would like to argue that the result still holds in a two-period model. To 
do this, we need to assume that the government is able to set an agenda and 
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commit to it. The agenda is simply a two-stage plan: in period  1, the govern- 
ment will hold a referendum on forming a free trade bloc with country B; and 
in period 2, regardless of the outcome of the first referendum, the government 
will hold another referendum on forming a free trade bloc with country C (the 
rest of the world). 
Notice that when t = 2, it is the people in sector y together with those in x 
that push the country toward further trade liberalization. Therefore, in order to 
block the regional trade arrangement, which by itself is in the interest of people 
in sector z, people in sector y have to promise and convince people in sector z 
that they will not agree to free trade with country C at t = 2. But such a promise 
is not time-consistent. That is, when  f = 2, it is in the interest of  people in 
sector y to vote for free trade with C. Given that free trade with C will likely 
be the outcome at f = 2, the best strategy for people in sector z at t = 1  is to 
vote for free trade with country B. In this way, they at least get the benefit of a 
lower price on good y.  Hence, by using  a regional bloc as an intermediate 
step, the government can pursue global free trade as an end result of a two- 
step process. 
The logic of  the above argument derives from the inability of one group of 
people to precommit their future actions to another group. Hence, using back- 
ward induction, we can show that the same argument holds in a multiple but 
finite-period world. The prospect of collusion cannot be ruled out ex ante in 
an infinite-period  model. However, the large number of people in each sector 
in the real world and the uncertainty about the future make collusion difficult. 
7.5.5  Regionalism as a Possible Deadend 
The discussion so far has centered on how regional trade blocs may change 
the dynamics of domestic political forces so as eventually to render global free 
trade feasible. It is important to make clear that regionalism is not a panacea 
for political opposition to multilateral free trade. Indeed, it is just as easy to 
construct models such that regional trade blocs may develop into a deadend, so 
that the countries involved may never be able to move toward global free trade. 
7.6  Concluding Discussion 
Using a modified gravity model that incorporates relative remoteness of ex- 
porters and importers from the world and an updated data set covering 1970- 
92, we have mapped out the current pattern of regionalization in trade. Bloc 
effects are apparent in many parts of the world. We also presented some esti- 
mates of the role that currency links within some major groupings might have 
played in promoting intragroup trade. We find that the world is better described 
as falling into two currency blocs, rather than three: a dollar bloc in the Pacific 
and a mark bloc in Europe. The tendency to stabilize bilateral exchange rates 
within these blocs apparently gave a statistically significant boost to bilateral 
trade in the 1970s, but this effect vanished in the 1980s. 
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made regarding regionalism, either to the effect that it can help build political 
momentum for multilateral liberalization (building blocs) or to the effect that 
it can undermine more general liberalization  (stumbling blocs). We review a 
simple model of our own that is in the first category: it illustrates one possible 
beneficial effect of trade blocs as a political building block to further trade lib- 
eralization. 
Are regional blocs building blocks or stumbling blocks to multilateral liber- 
alization?  Given that  political-economy  forces could go either  direction,  it 
would  be useful  to know  which  effect  dominates in  practice.  The gravity- 
model estimates offer us a tentative assessment on this question. A majority of 
FTAs, such as ASEAN and the Andean Pact, have increased trade with non- 
members, even as the members may have increased trade to an even greater 
extent with each other. In these cases, regionalism has apparently been consis- 
tent  with more general liberalization.  The pattern is mixed, however. Other 
FTAs, such as ERA, show evidence of trade diversion. Apparently regional- 
ism can, depending on the circumstances,  be associated  with either more or 
less general liberalization. 
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Comment  David Hummels 
In this paper the authors provide  some empirical evidence on the nature of 
regional trading patterns, then develop a political-economy model of regional- 
ization and trade liberalization. I will focus my comments entirely on the em- 
pirical sections of their paper. 
The authors argue that the best  way  to understand the nature of regional 
blocs is to examine trade patterns directly, rather than to focus on legal arrange- 
ments that bring them into force. Accordingly, they present evidence of these 
patterns in the form of a bilateral gravity model of trade. The idea is that in the 
context of a complete specialization model of trade it is possible to provide a 
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“norm” of bilateral trade.’ This norm is based on such variables as size, per 
capita incomes, and naturally occurring trade resistance factors like distance, 
adjacency, and language.  Once established,  the authors  look for deviations 
from this “norm” that indicate intraregional biases. This is done by  including 
intercepts for trading blocs, and by  including measures of bilateral exchange 
rate variability. 
In the context of a complete specialization  model, empirical  gravity  esti- 
mates describe both how trade is and how trade should be, If one finds com- 
plete specialization to be a compelling description of international production 
and trade, the authors’ approach is legitimate and informative. In this vein, I 
have only a few quibbles that I will present  here. Below, I will  address the 
theoretical foundations of this enterprise, and whether these inferences are ap- 
propriate. 
The authors report that size, incomes, and a variety of trade resistance fac- 
tors such as distance, adjacency, and language are significantly correlated with 
bilateral trade. This result is standard in the literature, and unsurprising here. 
They find that intraregional trade biases are significant, and that bilateral ex- 
change rate variability diminishes trade somewhat. However, this relationship 
breaks down in later years. Several problems are evident. 
First, the authors’ pool data on trade from 1970 through  1992 in order to 
measure the effects of  regionalism.  The hypothesis  implicit  in the regional 
bloc intercepts is that regional trading arrangements cause deviations from the 
“norm” of bilateral trade. Of course, NAFTA did not exist until sometime after 
the sample period ends, so it is a bit mysterious how it could have caused these 
deviations. While one might argue that anticipation of the trading bloc might 
explain patterns in advance, inclusion of  trade for 1970 stretches things a bit. 
The possibility this raises is simply that there is something unique about North 
American trade, or European or East Asian trade, that is not well captured in 
the included  variables. Thus, omitted  variables, and not  the presence  of  re- 
gional trading arrangements, cause deviations from bilateral trade “norms.” 
Second, the authors  justify inclusion of bilateral exchange rate variability as 
an explanatory variable by describing it as a kind of trade resistance, possibly 
one that regional currency  areas may mitigate. They report that  it has some 
diminishing effect on trade, and in table 7.6 present some upper-bound  esti- 
mates of the effect of exchange rate stabilization in the European Union be- 
tween  1980 and 1990. This table is misleading, even as an upper-bound esti- 
mate. The elasticity of trade with respect to volatility comes from 1980, easily 
the largest estimate. Further, the relationship between trade and volatility actu- 
ally becomes significantly positive by 1990,  a year in which volatility increases 
dramatically worldwide. 
1. Complete specialization may be due to product differentiation as in familiar monopolistic 
competition models, but can also be found in perfect competition models. See Deardorff, chapter 
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Third, bilateral exchange rate variability lacks strong theoretical foundations 
for inclusion here. It is not clear, for example, why bilateral variability matters 
and not overall variability. Further, the general equilibrium effects on trade are 
poorly  understood. If  the peso begins to fluctuate wildly  against the dollar, 
does it also fluctuate against other currencies? If so, doesn’t this increase costs 
for all trading  partners, resulting in price changes that offset the effects of 
the fluctuation? 
On a related  matter, there are a great many empirical gravity estimates in 
this  literature,  each with  a partial listing of  favorite variables  that plausibly 
correlate with trade. In this regard, empirical gravity estimates closely resem- 
ble  the  literature  on cross-country  growth  regressions.  Like  that  literature, 
gravity empirics would benefit greatly from robustness checking in the style 
of Levine and Renelt (1992). 
Above I suggested that, if one finds complete specialization a compelling 
description of production  and trade, the authors’  approach is legitimate and 
informative. In what follows, I want to reopen the question of the gravity mod- 
el’s  theoretical foundations and ask if  the inferences regarding intraregional 
trade biases drawn here are appropriate. 
Theoretical  foundations for gravity empirics employ complete specializa- 
tion  and identical preferences  to generate the  simple gravity  equation  with 
trade  proportional  to the bilateral  partners’  sizes and the  distance between 
them. This paper (and most other empirical gravity work) studies the volume 
of all trade, including primary, intermediate, capital, and consumption goods. 
However, the theory addresses only trade in consumption goods, which com- 
prise something on the order of one-third of all trade. For simple gravity pre- 
dictions to go through in a model including all trade, one needs complete spe- 
cialization  in  all  goods,  and  a production  analog  of  identical  preferences. 
Derived demands for nonconsumption goods come from production functions; 
thus, production functions must be identical across countries. Further, because 
goods are completely specialized, it must be that the same production function 
applies for all countries andfor all goods. This strains plausibility. 
Nevertheless, the gravity equation fits the data quite well, leading naturally 
to the question, why? I will offer at least a partial explanation here.2  Theoreti- 
cal gravity models are fundamentally  about the positive  proportionality be- 
tween country size (measured by partners’ GDPs) and bilateral trade. This rela- 
tionship  is  also very  strong  empirically. Theoretical  models  generating the 
equation imply that this relationship should hold exactly for every country pair. 
However, the econometric exercise does not impose such strong conditions. It 
asks if, on average, large countries have large bilateral trade volumes. What 
must be true for this to hold? 
Proposition 1: If a country trades a lot with the world as a whole, it must be 
that, on average, it trades a lot with its bilateral partners. 
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Proposition  2: If large countries trade more with the world as a whole, then 
large countries must, on average, trade more with their bilateral partners. 
These propositions  may  seem obvious, coming  as they do from a simple 
adding-up constraint, but their logic is important. Neither proposition says any- 
thing about individual partners; the volume of trade with any one partner could 
be greater or smaller than the sample mean. On average, however, a country 
with more trade overall must have more bilateral trade. So, the only thing that 
is necessary for the gravity equation to hold econometrically is for large coun- 
tries to have more trade with the world. Though one can imagine specific mod- 
els where there is no correlation between size and overall trade, it can be shown 
that this relationship is robust to a very wide class of trade models. It will be 
true of  models  in  which production  is completely  specialized  and trade is 
therefore bilaterally determinate. It will also be true of a broad class of models 
in which production is incompletely specialized and trade is therefore bilater- 
ally indeterminate. 
In the paper at hand, the authors wish to provide a “norm” of bilateral trade 
against which to measure deviations associated with intraregional trade biases. 
This suggests two problems. First, even if there is an overall tendency to trade 
more intraregionally, it is difficult to make normative statements about the bias. 
Second, regional trading bloc dummies are not necessarily evidence of intrare- 
gional bias. 
To see the first point, consider the problem of a small country choosing to 
import wheat from among ten equal-sized exporter countries, each of which 
charges the same c.i.f. price for its wheat. The gravity equation predicts that 
this country will import one-tenth of the total amount from each country. Sup- 
pose instead that it buys all of its wheat from one country. It is getting the same 
amount of  wheat at the same price, and so cannot be worse off. Indeed, any 
arbitrary combination of bilateral import volumes that adds up to its total im- 
port demand will give the  same welfare. And, if  overall import demand in- 
creases with the size of the importer, any arbitrary combination will still “fit” 
the gravity model econometrically. This illustrates that, with incomplete spe- 
cialization, bilateral trade volumes can depart from gravity predictions in arbi- 
trary ways that have absolutely no normative content. 
Regarding evidence of  intraregional bias in trading patterns, consider a neo- 
classical model with many homogeneous goods, many countries, and no barri- 
ers to trade. Trade is determined vis-2-vis the world and distributed in some 
indeterminate way  among its bilateral partners. A regression of  trade volume 
on country size indicates an average relationship between these variables for 
the sample. If a country’s total trade is higher than its size predicts (it lies above 
the regression line), then the average trade of  its bilateral pairs must also be 
higher than its size predicts. As a result, that country’s bilateral pairs will tend 
to have a positive intercept in a bilateral  trade estimate. For a given bilateral 
pair, if both countries have an above average tendency to trade overall, this bias 
in the intercept is reinforced. This is not to say that every one of the bilateral 
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To control for this effect, can one simply compare the within-bloc intercepts 
to intercepts indicating one partner is in the bloc and one out? The authors 
argue that if within-bloc dummies are positive and extrabloc dummies are neg- 
ative, this is evidence of  trade diversion. Assume that bloc members have a 
higher than average tendency to trade overall, and nonbloc members have a 
lower than average tendency. Then, intrabloc dummies will tend to be positive, 
and extrabloc dummies will be smaller or negative. This indicates that these 
countries’ trade volumes deviate from overall averages, but says nothing about 
their bilateral relationships. Why would a bloc have a systematically higher 
overall trade volume than its size predicts? Well, perhaps because these blocs 
are trade creating, not trade diverting! 
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Comment  Philip I. Levy 
I very much enjoyed reading the Frankel and Wei paper. It deals with issues 
that are central to the normative discussion about regional trade liberalization 
and provides some provocative answers. I will confine my comments about the 
empirical section of the paper to a brief concluding thought. I would like to 
focus my discussion instead on the theoretical political-economy issues, since 
this is an area in which I have done some work. Frankel and Wei give a very 
useful summary of work on this front and extend it with a new model of their 
own. 
Let me start by characterizing some of the challenges for anyone trying to 
make a theoretical  argument in this area. The basic question is whether re- 
gional agreements are likely to lead toward or away from multilateral liberal- 
ization. Frankel and Wei take it as given that multilateral liberalization is the 
ultimate  goal-the  economist’s  nirvana,  as they  put  it-an  assertion  with 
which I heartily concur. 
For  a regional agreement to lead  anywhere, we must have in mind some 
idea of  endogenous policy formation. Further, since regional agreements are 
“leading,” we wish to have such a model where we start with  some sort of 
regional decision and end with some sort of multilateral decision. 
It makes some difference whether one starts by assuming that-absent  any 
regional agreement-a  multilateral agreement is politically feasible or not. I 
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have done some work in which  multilateral  free trade is politically feasible 
initially and regional agreements may render it infeasible (Levy 1994). In this 
median voter setting I also show that the effect could not work in reverse. The 
idea is that the median voter-or  whoever is controlling the policy decision- 
will only allow his or her welfare to ratchet upward. If multilateral liberaliza- 
tion is preferred to an initial state, this is because the deciding actors would be 
better off under multilateral free trade. If they would prefer the initial state to 
multilateral free trade, why would they accept an intermediate state that made 
them worse off, so that multilateral free trade might then look appealing? 
This type of reasoning makes me pessimistic about the effects of regional 
agreements. Since much of  the world seems to be pursuing strategies of  re- 
gional liberalization, however, I  would like to be persuaded  this could be a 
positive force that expands possibilities for broader liberalization. 
There are a number of works in the literature that make arguments along 
these  lines, but I think the new  model presented by  Frankel  and Wei  is as 
convincing as any of them, so let me discuss it in detail. 
The authors set up a model in which we have two countries, A and B, and a 
rest-of-world  (country C). There are three sectors. Countries A  and B each 
have a comparative advantage in an  industry all their own, but produce and 
protect in the other two sectors. To enliven the discussion, let’s assume that A 
is efficient in agriculture and inefficient in textiles and in “other manufactures.” 
B is efficient in “other manufactures” and inefficient in agriculture and textiles. 
The argument is that, without a regional agreement, one can allocate people 
and switching costs within a country in such a way that workers in two of three 
sectors would constitute a majority and successfully oppose global liberaliza- 
tion, so multilateral free trade is initially  not feasible. Thus, in country A  a 
coalition of textile and manufacturing workers opposes multilateral free trade, 
while in B a coalition of agricultural and textile workers opposes multilateral 
free trade. (The Fernandez and Rodrik [1991] structure that the authors adopt 
explains why a majority might approve of a change ex post but not ex ante. I 
will continue my summary without this complication, however, as the central 
points are unchanged.) 
When these agents are presented with a bilateral free trade agreement be- 
tween A and B, it is favored by two out of three sectors in each of the countries, 
and the “other manufactures” workers in A and the agricultural workers in B 
are forced to switch into their countries’ efficient sectors. After the switch, they 
become supporters of multilateral free trade. Now there are majorities in favor 
of multilateral liberalization. 
The tenor of  this  argument  seems  similar to one put forward by  Rachel 
McCulloch and Peter Petri (1994), who argued that certain industry lobbies 
that opposed multilateral trade might get wiped out by regional liberalization. 
Frankel and Wei present two versions of this argument. In the first version, 
the opponents of  multilateral free trade do not anticipate the effects of their 
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far off in the future that the opponents of multilateral free trade don’t care). I 
find this myopic case fairly unpersuasive as a predictor of  world events. We 
see GATT liberalization and regional agreements proceeding concurrently and 
many of the opponents of multilateral liberalization-textiles  workers and ag- 
ricultural workers-are  also opponents of the regional agreements. The unions 
in the United States that opposed NAFTA seemed to recognize  the potential 
connection to multilateral free trade. 
If the opponents of multilateral free trade are far-sighted, it seems that they 
should continue to be able to block multilateral free trade. Recognizing this, 
Frankel and Wei present a case in which myopia is not necessary. They show 
that,  even  though  there  was  a  majority  opposed  to multilateral  free trade, 
through regional liberalization this coalition can be be undone. This approach 
is referred to in the paper as the “divide and conquer” approach. The govern- 
ment-for  reasons unspecified, but presumably because it agrees with us that 
multilateral free trade would be nirvana-sets  up  a very specific agenda in 
which there are two votes. The first vote is on a bilateral agreement between A 
and B. The second is on a bilateral agreement with C. 
The effect of this structure is to divide the coalition opposing multilateral 
free trade. Frankel and Wei solve backward: whatever the outcome of the first 
vote, the “other manufactures” sector and the efficient agriculture sector in A 
will want to take advantage of the lower prices on textiles offered by free trade 
with C.  Assuming the “other manufactures” sector is still intact at this stage 
(and not merged with agriculture), it would be unthreatened by the possibility 
of trade with B, since that will never be offered again (by assumption). Thus, 
agriculture and “other manufactures”  in A would join together to approve a 
free trade agreement with C in the second stage. 
The other inefficient  sector in A, textiles,  would anticipate this and favor 
the bilateral agreement with B in the first stage, since it offers cheaper “other 
manufactures” and since there seems to be no hope of maintaining a coalition 
against multilateral liberalization. Thus, in the end, the world is joined in mul- 
tilateral free trade. 
This strikes me as a very curious argument-the  path to multilateral liberal- 
ization runs through renouncing multilateral liberalization! It is absolutely es- 
sential to the model that there nut be a vote on multilateral free trade in the 
future. If there were, then it is straightforward to argue that the coalition op- 
posed to multilateral free trade would not break apart. It is crucial that at the 
second-stage vote, ifthe first bilateral agreement were rejected, it would never 
be introduced again. 
I find it somewhat hard to imagine that a government could credibly commit 
to such a strategy, particularly the kind of government that would set up such 
a special structure as a means to achieve multilateral free trade. It would be an 
especially impressive feat in a country in which two-thirds  of the voters are 
opposed to multilateral free trade. Thus, I am not left feeling confident about 
the beneficial impact of regional liberalizations. 226  Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei 
Frankel and Wei are thorough in their analysis and demonstrate the possibil- 
ity of regional agreements not leading to multilateral free trade (which I find 
more plausible, for reasons given above). However, if  one accepts their con- 
tention that the theoretical arguments could go either way, this suggests that 
empirical evidence should be all the more valuable. 
Yet, it seems to me, the kind of empirical evidence we would like to see 
would be a demonstration that one of the political-economy effects predicted 
by myself, by Frankel and Wei, or by others is occurring-that  regional liberal- 
ization has weakened or strengthened the power of an opponent of multilateral 
free trade (or, equally, that it has weakened or strengthened the power of a 
proponent of multilateral liberalization). Among regional agreements-real  or 
imagined-it  seems to me that only the European Union is sufficiently  ad- 
vanced as a region to have experienced such effects. By casual observation (I 
think of French agriculture or European  auto manufacturing) it is not at all 
clear that regional liberalization has strengthened the prospects for multilat- 
eral liberalization. 
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